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Abstract
This paper presents a two-sector endogenous growth model where public spend-
ing {which is endogenous and productive{ may generate equilibrium indeterminacy.
Under certain mild conditions, there exists a continuum of expectations-driven equi-
librium paths approaching a common balanced growth path. We show that the
welfare-maximizing equilibrium path is associated with a labor supply as large as
possible at time zero. Furthermore, the welfare cost of indeterminacy can represent
more than a 2:1% of total consumption. It is also shown that public debt may be
used to coordinate private expectations on current and future prices, and therefore,
may break down the indeterminacy result. The equilibrium selection mechanism
works through the amount of debt issued at time zero.
¤I am grateful to Suman Ghosh, Kevin Lansing and Manuel S. Santos for valuable comments to this
version of the paper. E-mail: so37@cornell.edu
11. Introduction
As it is well known, the existence of complementarities between individual decisions
may lead to situations in which the competitive equilibrium is not determinate, i.e., there
may be multiple equilibria supported by di®erent expectations on equilibrium prices. A
rich variety of models with these kinds of complementarities has been proposed so far to
study the empirical plausibility of such expectations-driven equilibria. In representative
agent in¯nite horizon models of capital accumulation, it is generally assumed that the
marginal productivity of private inputs is a function of the aggregate or average level of
a speci¯ed endogenous variable. In models with one state variable, Boldrin and Rusti-
chini (1994) consider a positive externality from the aggregate stock of physical capital;
Benhabib and Farmer (1994) assume that the externalities spring from the average levels
of physical capital and labor; Perli (1998) assumes capital and labor externalities in a
model with home production. In two sector models with physical and human capital
accumulation, Chamley (1993) considers a positive labor externality in the production of
human capital; Xie (1994) studies the case of a positive externality from the average level
of human capital in the production of goods; Benhabib and Perli (1994) analyze the con-
sequences of having di®erent combinations of externalities together with the assumption
of an endogenous determination of the leisure time.
The success of these models in yielding the indeterminacy result under plausible pa-
rameter values has been mixed. While in one sector models the required externality from
physical capital is unrealistically large, in two sector models, a too high elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution for consumption is needed. On the other hand, models with
home production or with a human capital sector and valued leisure seem to be more ap-
propriate to explain the issue of equilibrium indeterminacy. From our viewpoint, there
are two important points which are still unsolved in this literature. First, there is not a
systematic study of the welfare properties of the equilibria set. Second, the idea of design-
ing an equilibrium selection mechanism which operates on the formation of expectations
has been unfruitful so far.
In this paper, we present a two-sector endogenous growth model where linkages be-
tween agents come from the existence of a public sector which conducts taxation and
spending policies. One premise in our model is that some categories of public spending
a®ect the productivity of private inputs. Since public spending depends on taxation rev-
enues, and since these revenues are a function of the labor and saving decisions taken by
the agents, it is easy to trace the source of the complementarity in the agents' actions.
2The premise of productive public spending has been extensively used in theoretical
models of optimal growth as an important determinant of the rate of growth, and in
empirical studies as a possible explanation of the productivity slowdown observed in the
last decades. The ¯rst models to include public spending in the production function of
goods were developed by Shell (1967) and Arrow and Kurz (1970). More recently, Barro
(1990), Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1992), Baxter and King (1993), Benhabib et al.
(1996), Cassou and Lansing (1998), Cazavillan (1996) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994),
among others, present models in which public spending is also productive. Empirical
evidence in favor of this premise has been reported in a large number of papers [e.g.,
Aschauer (1989), Evans and Karras (1994), Morrison and Schwartz (1996), Lynde and
Richmond (1993), Munnell (1990), Ratner (1983), among others].
Our model overcomes the two major criticisms to the existing literature on equilibrium
indeterminacy. First, we start by calibrating our model by making use of estimates from
the empirical literature. Then, we show that equilibrium indeterminacy arises for that
calibrated economy. In contrast to previous models, indeterminacy does not rely on
unrealistically high returns to scale. Second, we carry out a complete welfare analysis of
the equilibria set, and propose a simple equilibrium selection mechanism, which comes
out naturally from the model.
The intuition underlying the high plausibility of our model to generate a multiplicity of
equilibria follows from the typeof complementarities generated by thepublicsector. When
capital and labor income is taxed at a °at rate, the level of productive public spending
is a function of a large set of exogenous and endogenous variables. This set includes
taxation and spending policy parameters, the stocks of physical and human capital, hours
worked, and the interest and wage rates. Indeed, it is the expected equilibrium values for
these latter variables what makes the existence of a continuum of self-ful¯lling equilibria
possible.
At the initial period, if the representative agent expects low interest and wage rates
to prevail in equilibrium, she will choose a low saving rate and a high allocation of time
in the human capital sector. By doing so, taxation revenues, and consequently, public
spending will be low. Since the marginal productivity of capital and labor are a®ected by
the public expenditure, the interest and wage rates will be correspondingly low in equi-
librium. Starting from this equilibrium, imagine now an increase in the expected values
for the interest and wage rates. In order to reach a new equilibrium from these corrected
expectations, the saving rate and hours worked must go up. Due to the increase in the
3labor supply, and in the level of public expenditure, output also increases. Therefore, a
higher saving rate is possible in equilibrium if the increase in consumption is su±ciently
low; in other words, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption is low.
The fact that private expectations on equilibrium prices are self-ful¯lling, along with
the externality-type complementarities considered in the literature has hindered the study
of equilibrium selection mechanisms. [Christiano and Harrison (1996) and Guo and Lans-
ing (1998) propose coordination mechanisms based on quite ad hoc taxation schemes, in
which the government sets tax rates as complicated functions of economic variables such
as employment or production.] In our model, we take advantage of the role of the gov-
ernment as the source of complementarities in order to break down the self-ful¯llingness
of expectations. All we need is to permit the government to run de¯cits. Moreover, the
possibility of choosing the level of debt to be issued at the initial period can be used to
target the interest and wage rates in equilibrium, thus canceling the e®ects of private ex-
pectations. It should be emphasized that the use of public debt as a coordination device
is not restricted to the model with productive public spending. We illustrate below its
applicability in a model with externalities from the average level of human capital. Fur-
thermore, our claim is that public debt may be an e®ective coordination device in more
general setups, such as models with imperfect capital markets, and models with money
in the utility or production functions [e.g., Benhabib and Farmer (1998), Benhabib et al.
(1998)].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the model and
present two indeterminacy results. Section 3 contains the welfare analysis of equilibrium
indeterminacy. In Section 4, we show the ability of public debt to work as a coordination
device, and present some computations of the welfare gain of coordination. In Section
5, we extend the analysis of coordination to a model with human capital externalities.
Finally, in Section 6 we draw the main conclusions, and Section 7 contains the appendixes.
2. The Model
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of identical dynasties who derive
utility from the consumption of an aggregate good. The size of the population is normal-
ized to unity, and we abstract from population growth. The instantaneous utility function
has a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption. Future utility is
discounted at the positive rate ½. The problem of a representative household is then to







The household owns the stock of physical capital which has a gross rental price of r(t).
Labor is supplied at the gross wage rate !(t). The government collects taxes from capital
and labor income at the constant rate ¿. Thus, the budget constraint for the representative
household is,
c(t) + _ k(t) = (1 ¡¿)[r(t)k(t) + !(t)h(t)u(t)] + T(t) (2.2)
where _ k(t) denotes investment in physical capital, u(t) is the amount of raw time devoted
to work, and h(t) is the level of human capital or e±ciency. T(t) denotes transfers from
the government. The e±ciency of labor can be increased by devoting time to the human
capital sector. The technology in this sector is
_ h(t) = B(1 ¡u(t))h(t) (2.3)
In this model the government has two types of activities: collects taxes from the
household sector, and spends total revenues in infrastructure and transfers. The budget
constraint must be balanced at every period, i.e.
¿ [r(t)k(t) + !(t)h(t)u(t)] = g(t) + T(t) (2.4)
where g(t) denotes expenditure in infrastructure. The spending policy is assumed to be
constant, a ¯xed share, say ¯, of total revenues is devoted to infrastructure. Therefore,
g(t) = ¯¿ [r(t)k(t) + !(t)h(t)u(t)] (2.5)
The output sector is competitive, and each ¯rm has access to the same technology.
Public spending in infrastructure is assumed to a®ect the production set. For analytical





where x(t) denotes the services derived from public expenditure in infrastructure1. The
determination of these services will be speci¯ed below under two di®erent assumptions on
1At this point, x(t) can also have the interpretation of technology or basic knowledge which, given its
nature of public good, has to be publicly ¯nanced [see Shell (1966), (1967) and Antinol¯ et al. (1998) for
a deeper description of this interpretation of x(t)].
5the nature of public investment. The elasticity of per capita output with respect to the
services from public investment is given by ®2:
Pro¯ts maximization implies that rental prices for capital and labor equalize the re-
spective marginal products,
r(t) = Fk[k(t);h(t)u(t);x(t)] (2.7)
!(t) = Fhu[k(t);h(t)u(t);x(t)] (2.8)
The ¯rst order conditions for the consumer problem involve the optimal allocation of
income between consumption and investment, and the allocation of time between working
and education activities. For income allocation, the consumer must equalize the marginal







As for time allocation, the consumer must equalize the marginal revenue of time devoted



















In order to complete the characterization of a competitive equilibrium, we need to write
out an equation for the determination of per capita services from public investment. We
will distinguish two di®erent cases depending on the nature of public investment: Rival
and excludable public infrastructure, and congestionable public infrastructure.
2.1 Rival and Excludable Public Infrastructure
We start our analysis of public infrastructure assuming that it is rival {there is a
quantity allocated to each ¯rm{ and excludable. As a consequence, there is no congestion
in the services derived by each ¯rm, that is,
x(t) = g(t) (2.12)
where g(t) denotes public investment per ¯rm.
6Balanced Growth Path
A balanced growth path is de¯ned as an equilibrium solution such that, for some initial
conditions, consumption, investment, capital stocks, and government spending grow at
constant rates, and hours worked remain constant. By imposing these conditions, it
follows from (2.2) and (2.3) that the rate of growth for physical capital, ºk, and human
capital, ºh, must satisfy the following relationship,
ºk =
µ 1 ¡ ®
1 ¡ ® ¡ ®2
¶
ºh (2.13)
Moreover, evaluating (2.9) and (2.10) along a balanced growth path, we obtain,
ºk =
(B ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ®)
(1 ¡ ®)¾ ¡ ®2
(2.14)
It is clear from (2.2) that production and consumption grow also at ºk. The long-run
value for hours worked, u¤, can then be easily obtained from (2.3). It can be readily shown
that if ® 6= ®2 and (1 ¡ ®)¾ 6= ®2, then there is a unique interior balanced growth path.
We assume throughout the paper that these latter conditions are satis¯ed, and restrict
our analysis to the case of a single balanced growth equilibrium.
We o®er here two alternative calibrations of the model based on di®erent estimates
of parameter ®2. The empirical literature on the productivity e®ects of public inputs
has yielded a wide variety of estimates. Leaving out di®erences regarding econometric
techniques, data sets, and the de¯nition of the public input, one can ¯nd estimates as high
as 0.39 [Aschauer (1989)], and estimates as low as 0.06 and 0.1 [Ratner (1983) and Munnel
(1990), respectively]. We will consider two benchmark economies, one with ®2 = 0:39 and
the second with ®2 = 0:1. Values for ¯scal policy parameters are constructed as follows.
Using a tax rate of 0.36 on capital income, a 0.40 on labor, and a capital share of 0.36, we
obtain an estimate for the common tax rate on capital and labor income, ¿, of 0.3856. For
the percentage of public revenues spent in infrastructure, ¯, we use data from the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) published by the Department of Commerce. We
considered local, state and federal investment in transportation, energy, natural resources,
civilian safety and housing and community services as a proxy for public investment in
infrastructure. Next, using ¿ = 0:3856, we calculated the value of ¯ for the last 30
years. >From 1981 to 1996, this value was roughly constant at 0.045. For the remaining
parameters, we use standard values in the growth literature. The discount factor, ½, is
set at 0.05, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption at 0.5, and B is
chosen so that total production grows at 2.9%.
7Benchmark economy 1: ½ = 0:05; ¾ = 2; A = 3:5; ® = 0:36; ®2 = 0:39; B = 0:0903; ¿ =
0:3856 and ¯ = 0:045.
Benchmark economy 2: ½ = 0:05; ¾ = 2; A = 3:5; ® = 0:36; ®2 = 0:1; B = 0:1034; ¿ =
0:3856 and ¯ = 0:045.
Transitional Dynamics
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®¡®2 : By de¯nition, these new variables are constant along a bal-
anced growth path, (^ k¤, ^ c¤, u¤). In our benchmark economy 1, the balanced growth path
is de¯ned by the following values: ^ k¤ = 1:09728; ^ c¤ = 0:49466; u¤ = 0:87458, ºk = 0:029
and ºh = 0:01132: For the benchmark economy 2, we get: ^ k¤ = 11:53684; ^ c¤ = 5:19751;
u¤ = 0:76366, ºk = 0:029 and ºh = 0:02443:
Our ¯rst result shows that the existence of a continuum of equilibria is very likely
under completely standard parameter values.
Proposition 1: Consider the economy described by (2.1){(2.12). Then
a) There is a continuum of equilibria converging to the balanced growth path if and
only if,
(i) ® < ®2 < (1 ¡ ®)¾
b) There is no equilibrium converging to the balanced growth path if and only if,
(ii) ® > ®2 > (1 ¡ ®)¾
c) There is a unique equilibrium converging to the balanced growth path if and only
if neither (i) nor (ii) hold.
8Proof: See Appendix I.
According to this Proposition, our benchmark economy 1 satis¯es condition (i), and
therefore the equilibrium is indeterminate. For our benchmark economy 2, neither (i) nor
(ii) are satis¯ed, and consequently the equilibrium is determinate. In the next section, we
show however that by assuming congestion in public infrastructure the equilibrium may
also be indeterminate in this latter economy.
2.2 Public Infrastructure Subject to Congestion
We consider now the existence of some degree of congestion in the use of public
expenditure. The services derived by each ¯rm from a given level of aggregate public
investment decrease with the aggregate stock of physical capital and increase with the







where µ > 0 gives the degree of congestion, and G(t) denotes aggregate public investment.
Proposition 2: Consider the economy described by (2.1){(2.11) and (2.15). Then















c) There is a unique equilibrium converging to the balanced growth path if and only
if neither (i) nor (ii) hold.
Proof: See Appendix I.
According to Proposition 2, under parameter values de¯ning our benchmark economy
2, the equilibrium is indeterminate if 2:6 < µ < 5:9:
In general, it is clear from Proposition 2 that, under congestion, the indeterminacy
result may arise for very small values of ®2: This result stands in sharp contrast with those
9obtained in the literature with human capital spillovers, where a high external e®ect is
required to produce equilibrium indeterminacy. It should also be clear that the size of
the population has scale e®ects under this formulation of the services derived from public
investment. These scale e®ects do not a®ect however our indeterminacy result presented
in Proposition 2.
For analytical convenience, we will assume from now on that public investment is rival
and excludable. This assumption, however, does not a®ect any of our results qualitatively.
3. Welfare Analysis of the Equilibria Set
The indeterminacy result presented in Section 2 immediately raises a question about
the rank of expectations-driven equilibria in terms of welfare. Xie (1994), using the
Lucas (1988) model, is able to rank the equilibria only after assuming that the inverse
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution equals the physical capital income share
(in our notation, ¾ = ®), However, according to the empirical estimates of these two
parameters, this restriction turns out to be quite unlikely. In this section, we resort to
numerical methods to carry out the welfare analysis without imposing further restrictions
on parameter values. Before starting the discussion of our numerical results, it might be
helpful to see the set of interior equilibria as indexed by the initial labor supply, u(0). The
main e®ects of u(0) on the level of welfare are the following. First, consumption at time
zero is an increasing function of u(0). Second, a larger u(0) implies a lower investment
rate in human capital along the transitional period, and therefore, a lower level of human
capital along the balanced growth path. As ^ c¤ =
c(t)
h(t)Á does not depend on u(0), it must
be true that the long-run consumption path is a decreasing function of u(0). These two
opposite e®ects of u(0) can be shown in a more transparent manner. We write the change
in the lifetime utility with respect to changes in u(0) as a function of the change in the


















































10Although it is clear that
@c(0)
@u(0) > 0, it is not always true that
@r(t)
@u(0) ¸ 0 for all t, and
therefore, the sign of (3.1) cannot be neatly determined. In order to shed some light on
this problem, we present in Figure 1 the interest rates associated with two di®erent initial
values of u(0)2. Given that interest rates cross at some t, it seems to be very hard to
establish any general result on the welfare properties of the equilibria set.
Our welfare computations are based on the solution to the linearized system. One
concern which arises from using linear approximations is the extent to which the linearized
system mimics the nonlinear dynamics. Figure 2 displays the interest rate as obtained
from the linear and non linear systems, for our benchmark economy 1. It should be clear
from this ¯gure that the linear dynamics is a good approximation in a signi¯cantly large
neighborhood of the steady state.
Thus, after linearizing the dynamical system _ ^ k(t); _ ^ c(t); _ u(t) around the steady state






















which converges to the balanced consumption path
c
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where vi = (vi1;vi2;vi3)0 for i = 1;2 denotes the eigenvector associated with the negative
eigenvalue ¸i, and ³1 and ³2 are integration constants whose values depend on u0.
Our procedure to compute the lifetime utility function3,
R 1
0 e¡½t cu0(t)1¡¾¡1
1¡¾ dt, along the
equilibrium consumption path given by (3.2), yields an expression which can be numeri-
cally computed at a relatively low cost.
Our computations show that lifetime utility increases with u(0). (Figure 3 presents
the lifetime utility as a function of u(0).) Thus, the welfare-maximizing equilibrium is
associated with a labor supply as large as possible at time zero. Furthermore, we found the
same result for alternative calibrations of the model rendering equilibrium indeterminacy.
This result contrasts with that of Xie (1994). Under his version of the Lucas (1988) model,
the welfare-maximizing equilibrium has the lowest possible labor supply at time zero.
2We follow a Euler method to compute numerically the interest rates using the nonlinear system of
di®erential equations.
3See Appendix II for a description of the numerical procedure.
113.1 The Welfare Cost of Indeterminacy
As a ¯rst step before considering how to introduce a coordination mechanism in order
to select the best equilibrium, it seems natural to inquire about the cost of miscoordina-
tion. The magnitude of this cost should be used to assess the bene¯ts from intervention
policies which are addressed to accomplish a particular equilibrium. Moreover, as such
policies generally involve some implementation costs, one should assure that these latter
costs are worth paying.
Making use of the approximation to the lifetime utility presented in the previous
subsection, we can calculate the welfare cost of starting at u0


























The welfare cost of miscoordination is given, thus, as a percentage of consumption. As
interior equilibrium paths are indexed by u(0) 2 (0;1), the maximum welfare cost from
indeterminacy is °1
0.
Table 1 presents the magnitude of °1
0 and °1
0:9 for di®erent initial values of k(0).
Since our computations are heavily based on linear approximations, we try to minimize
approximation errors by setting an initial condition in a close interval of the steady state.
Throughout this paper we shall set k(0) = 0:95^ k¤. For our benchmark economy 1, we
obtained °1
0 = 2:1%, and °1
0:9 = :196%.
Table 1
k(0) = 0:75^ k¤ k(0) = 0:8^ k¤ k(0) = 0:85^ k¤ k(0) = 0:9^ k¤ k(0) = 0:95^ k¤
°1
0 .02380 .02305 .02234 .02167 .02103
°1
0:9 .00220 .00214 .00208 .00202 .00196
Notes. These computations were carried out under benchmark economy 1, and h(0) = 1.
The inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for consumption, ¾, is a key
parameter in the determination of the magnitude of these welfare costs. The initial level
of consumption, and consequently, the welfare cost of indeterminacy, strongly depend on
this parameter. Table 2 presents the value of °1
0, °1
0:9, and initial consumption for di®erent
values of ¾.
12Table 2
¾ = 1 ¾ = 2 ¾ = 3 ¾ = 4
°1
0 .02342 .02103 .02043 .02013
°1
0:9 .00208 .00196 .00192 .00190
cu0=0(0) .08283 .46770 .61923 .69540
cu0=0:9(0) .08918 .48225 .63484 .71125
cu0=1(0) .08989 .48387 .63658 .71301
Notes. These computations were carried out under benchmark economy 1, and
k(0) = 0:95^ k¤ and h(0) = 1. (Notice that ^ k¤ refers to the steady state value associated
with the corresponding value of ¾.)
It is worth mentioning that a subset of equilibria, indexed by (0; ¹ u0), for some 0 < ¹ u0 <
1, entails a negative gross investment for a ¯nite number of periods. Therefore, adding to
the model a restriction of non reversible capital, the set of interior equilibria is reduced
to [¹ u0;1). For our benchmark economy 1, ¹ u0 = 0:82625. The welfare consequences of
restricting the analysis to equilibrium paths with a positive gross investment may be then
sizable.
4. Debt as a Coordination Device
The problem of equilibrium selection has captured the attention of researchers in many
di®erent ¯elds. Game theorists use dynamic coordination games describing a disequilib-
rium process along which players learn about their opponents and adjust their strategies
over time. The challenge in this framework is to show under which conditions the long-run
equilibrium corresponds to the Pareto-e±cient equilibrium. Hence, addressing the prob-
lem of equilibrium selection by considering a learning process entails departing from the
assumption of perfect foresight. Besides, its applicability is strongly restricted to models
with a ¯nite number of equilibria. Evans, Honkapohja and Romer (1998) study a growth
model in which there may be a ¯nite number of perfect foresight equilibria which are
characterized by constant interest and growth rates from t = 0 on. The authors, then,
introduce a learning process to select one of those equilibria. In our model, however, it
should be clear that the existence of a continuum of equilibria, along with the transitional
dynamics for endogenous variables, prevent us from using learning in the same way. Fur-
thermore, Du®y (1994) questions the usefulness of disequilibrium learning mechanisms to
pick out locally unique solutions. This author presents an example where the use of a
13learning process leads agents to believe in a continuum of solutions paths converging to
an indeterminate steady state.
The approach we follow in this paper is to design an equilibrium selection mechanism
which operates directly on the formation of expectations. More precisely, given the as-
sumption of perfect foresight, the mechanism works on the expected initial value for the
interest and wage rates. In the model of Section 2, the expected values for these prices
are determined solely by the self-ful¯lling expected value for the equilibrium labor sup-
ply. In contrast, when the government is allowed to run de¯cits, it is possible to break
down the self-ful¯llingness of di®erent expected values for prices by issuing the appropri-
ate amount of debt. The interest and wage rates at time zero can thus be targeted by
choosing conveniently the debt policy at time zero. The idea of using public debt to peg
the interest rate in order to achieve equilibrium determinacy is, to some extent, related to
the idea used by Calvo (1979) and Woodford (1994) in a monetary economy. Woodford
studies a cash-in-advance economy and shows how pegging the nominal interest rate by
using debt allows for price determinacy and a higher level of welfare with respect to the
indeterminate case.4
If we denote the level of public debt by b(t), then the total assets held by the household
are now a(t) = k(t) + b(t). At this point, we leave aside questions regarding the optimal
determination of b(0), and we study the consequences of having di®erent initial levels of
debt. The consumer budget constraint is,
c(t) + _ a(t) = (1 ¡ ¿)[r(t)a(t) + !(t)h(t)u(t)] + T(t) (4.1)
First order conditions for utility maximization are still given by (2.9) and (2.10). The





0 (1¡¿)r(s)ds ¸ 0 (4.2)
4Our simple equilibrium selection mechanism di®ers from the ones presented by Christiano and Harri-
son (1999) and Guo and Lansing (1998) among others, in some crucial aspects. These authors postulate
that the government sets the tax rate following a certain tax schedule which depends on state and control
variables. Then, conditions on parameters values de¯ning the tax schedule are established in order to
obtain a steady-state equilibrium exhibiting saddle-path stability. Consequently, when the government
sets conveniently these parameters values and applies the tax schedule, the equilibrium path converging
to the steady state is also unique. However, there is no possibility of selecting an alternative equilibrium
path converging to the same steady-state solution. The coordination mechanism presented in this paper,
on the contrary, does not rely on any pre-established control schedule. The dynamics of public debt is
simply determined by the budget constraint for the government. In addition, the government is able to
select a particular equilibrium path converging to the steady-state equilibrium.











As the government is allowed to issue debt, the budget constraint is,
_ b(t) + ¿[r(t)a(t) + !(t)h(t)u(t)] = g(t) + T(t) + r(t)b(t) (4.4)
The left hand side is the sum of taxation proceeds and the change in the level of debt.
The right-hand side is the total spending on infrastructure, transfers and interest pay-
ments on debt. The corresponding condition to rule out Ponzi games for the government
is that along the balanced growth path, debt cannot grow as fast as the interest rate.
Furthermore, a necessary condition for the existence of a balanced growth path is that
the share of debt in the portfolio be constant in the long-run. Hence, we shall restrict our
analysis to public policies consistent with long-run positive levels of debt growing at the
rate ºk given by (2.14).














0 (1¡¿)r(s)ds(g(t) + T(t))dt (4.5)
where y(t) denotes output per capita. In equilibrium, the present value of taxation rev-
enues equals the present value of public expenditure plus the initial value of debt.
As in the model without public debt, we assume that infrastructure spending is a
constant share, ¯, of taxation revenues,
g(t) = ¯¿[r(t)a(t) + !(t)h(t)u(t)] (4.6)
The share 1¡¯ of revenues collected from debt taxation is returned back to the household
as lump-sum transfers. It is worth noticing that, since public investment in infrastructure
is now a function of the ongoing level of debt, the interest and wage rates at time zero are
a function of b(0). We show below that this dependence makes possible the coordination
of private expectations on initial equilibrium prices by choosing appropriately the initial
public indebtedness.
Balanced Growth Path. It is readily shown that along the balanced growth path, growth
rates for physical capital, ºk, human capital, ºh, hours worked, u¤, and the interest rate
15are not a®ected by the presence of public debt. The ratio of debt to physical capital can







where r¤ denotes the before-tax interest rate which is given by,
r
¤ =
(1 ¡ ®)B¾ ¡ ®2½
((1 ¡ ®)¾ ¡ ®2)(1 ¡ ¿)
(4.8)










For our benchmark economy 1, the balanced growth path has ºk = 0:029, ºh =
0:011328125 and u¤ = 0:8745891714; the long-run ratio of debt to physical capital is
b
k = 1:225010645, and
g
y = 0:02504934268: The Jacobian matrix of the dynamical system
evaluated at this balanced growth path has two negative eigenvalues ¸1 = ¡0:4688175423,
¸2 = ¡1:223172648, and two positive eigenvalues, ¸3 = 0:079, and ¸4 = 0:1833238911,
yielding, thus, equilibrium determinacy. Therefore, for any given initial values for k(0),
h(0) and b(0), there is a unique equilibrium path converging to the balanced growth path.
As the government is assumed to set the initial level of debt, the set of equilibria can then
be parameterized by b(0).
For our benchmark economy 2, Proposition 1 showed that when debt is not allowed,
the balanced growth path is determinate. Given the initial value for the state variable,
there exists a unique value for u(0) under which the economy converges to the balanced
growth path. Consequently, when we allow for public debt, there must be a unique
value for b(0) such that the equilibrium converges to the balanced growth path. As
expected, the Jacobian matrix has one negative eigenvalue ¸1 = ¡0:2051215393 and
three positive eigenvalues ¸2 = 0:079, ¸3 = 0:1523445047 and ¸4 = 0:5149016759. Since
under equilibrium determinacy the initial value of debt does not a®ect the equilibrium
value of u(0), there is at most one b(0) which ful¯lls the lifetime budget constraint for the
government, (4.5).
In the next section we analyze the welfare consequences of using debt as a coordination
mechanism.
164.1 Welfare Gains from Coordination
In this section, we study the ability of debt to enhance utility when the equilibrium
is indeterminate. For this purpose, we change slightly the previous public policy without
altering the nature of the economy. We concentrate on a particular spending policy which
yields debt growing at the rate ºk from t = 0 on. The reason to consider this scenario is
to have an indeterminate level of debt along the balanced growth path. As a consequence,
the long-run share of debt in the portfolio,
b
k; becomes a parameter in the model. We can




k(0). Assuming that the
government has no debt at time zero, we can say that debt is e®ective as a coordination
device, if there is at least one debt policy which renders higher utility than the worst
equilibrium that may arise in the economy without debt.
In order to make the composition of the portfolio indeterminate in the balanced growth
path, we consider the same infrastructure policy as in the previous section, that is (4.6).
Regarding transfers, we establish now the following policy,
T(t) = (1 ¡ ¯)¿[r(t)a(t) + !(t)h(t)u(t)] + (ºk ¡ r(t))b(t) (4.9)
where ºk is the long-run physical capital growth rate. It follows then from (4.4) that the
law of motion for debt under this policy is
_ b(t) = ºkb(t) (4.10)
which gives a continuum of balanced growth paths indexed by
b(t)
k(t). Moreover, consider
the balanced growth path associated with a zero level of debt. It follows then from (4.10)
that we must have b(t) = 0 for all t ¸ 0, which corresponds to the model presented in
Section 3. Thus, the welfare analysis of coordination reduces to the determination of
the optimal long-run share of debt in the portfolio, and of the optimal initial issue of
debt, b(0): A simplifying assumption is that government revenues from selling the initial
debt are wasted. However, the revenues derived from its taxation are productively spent.
Regarding the distortionary e®ects of issuing b(0) we consider two di®erent scenarios.
Initial debt crowds out private investment in physical capital. After substituting the bud-
get constraint for the government, and the equilibrium interest and wage rates in the
budget constraint for the household, we get
_ k(0) + b(0) = (1 ¡ ¯¿)y(0) ¡¯¿r(0)b(0) ¡ c(0) (4.11)
and
_ k(t) = (1 ¡ ¯¿)y(t) ¡ ¯¿r(t)b(t) ¡c(t) for t > 0 (4.12)
17As is clear from (4.11), initial investment in physical capital and consumption are reduced
in order to buy public debt. After period zero, investment jumps to the level given by
the stable manifold approaching the balanced growth path.
Because the discontinuity in investment at t = 0, the computation of the welfare
gains of coordination for a given b
k proceeds in two steps. First, given k(0) and b(0), we
compute c(0) and u(0) such that the value of endogenous variables at an arbitrarily small
² ¼ 0, (k(²);b(²);h(²);c(²);u(²)) satisfy the following conditions: They are implied by
equilibrium conditions at time zero, and belong to the stable manifold of the system from
² onward. Second, we set b(0) in order to maximize the lifetime utility (i.e., b(0) is chosen
such that u(0) = 1).5
Table 3 presents the following information for di®erent values of b
k: The initial level
of debt that induces u(0) = 1 in equilibrium, initial consumption, initial investment in
physical capital, and the welfare gain from coordination, °co (measured as the percentage
increase in consumption with respect to the equilibrium with u(0) = 0 in the economy
without debt). Some comments are in order. For very low values of initial debt, the
welfare gain from coordination represents a 2:1% of consumption. A high initial debt
may crowd out initial investment to the point of having a negative net investment. When
non reversible investment is assumed, the maximum welfare gain is in the order of 6%.
Table 3
b
k = 10¡3 b






b(0) 1:081 10¡3 1:084 10¡2 :05508 :10419 .11233
c(0) :48401 :48522 :49069 :49672 :49772
_ k(0) :10293 :09318 :04902 2:527 10¡4 ¡:00810
°co .02103 .02490 .04219 .06093 .06400
Notes: These computations were carried out under benchmark economy 1, and
k(0) = 0:95^ k¤and h(0) = 1. (Notice that ^ k¤ refers to the steady state value in our
benchmark economy 1 without public debt.)
No crowding-out e®ects from initial debt. In this alternative scenario, we need to make a
somehow arti¯cial assumption: timing within period zero is such that the initial debt is
bought out of initial consumption, and therefore investment is not distorted. Under this
assumption, the computation of the welfare gain of coordination becomes straightforward.






has been set, we choose b(0) in order to induce u(0) = 1 in equilibrium. Then,
as initial debt must be bought out of initial consumption, the lifetime utility is given by,6
W(k(0);h(0)) = W(k(0);h(0);b(0))
"





where W(k(0);h(0);b(0)) is the lifetime utility for an economy with initial conditions
given by k(0);h(0) and b(0). Using the approximation to the lifetime utility presented in
Section 3, we can compute the welfare levels associated with di®erent values of
b
k.
Table 4 summarizes some of the consequences of coordinating expectations with debt
under non crowding-out e®ects. The most relevant feature is that the welfare gain becomes
negative for values of b(0) larger than 0:11.
Table 4
b
k = 10¡5 b
k = 10¡4 b
k = 10¡3 b
k = 10¡2 b
k = :1
b(0) 1:0805 10¡5 1:0806 10¡4 1:0810 10¡3 :01084 .11233
c(0) :48386 :48378 :48292 :47437 :38538
_ k(0) :10401 :10401 :10401 :10403 :10426
°nco .02058 .02042 .01884 .00310 -.14725
Notes: These computations were carried out under benchmark economy 1, and
k(0) = 0:95^ k¤and h(0) = 1. (Notice that ^ k¤ refers to the steady state value in our
benchmark economy 1 without public debt.)
It can be concluded from Table 4 that the use of debt to select the best equilibrium
may bring out non-negligible increases in welfare. Indeed, issuing debt worth 10¡5 at
time zero represents a welfare gain in the order of 2:05% of consumption. Under our
assumption that initial debt is bought from initial consumption, the optimal debt policy
consists of issuing the minimal amount of debt required to induce u(0) = 1 in equilibrium.
As we discus above, besides its coordinating role, public debt has direct e®ects on the
productivity in the output sector by in°uencing public expenditure in infrastructure.














dt. Di®erentiating this \value function" with re-
spect to c(0), and noticing that W(k(0);h(0)) = W(k(0);h(0);b(0)) + d
dc(0)W(k(0);h(0);b(0))dc(0) and
dc(0) = ¡b(0), equation (4.10) is directly obtained.
195. Indeterminacy and Coordination in a Model with Human
Capital Externalities
This section addresses the issue of the coordinating role of public debt in a framework
where indeterminacy is due to productive externalities from the average level of human
capital [see, Benhabib and Perli (1994) for a complete characterization of the conditions
leading to equilibrium indeterminacy in this kind of model]. We therefore assume that
the elasticity of output with respect to public infrastructure is zero, and show that the
use of debt is still an e®ective device to coordinate private beliefs.
In order to carry out this exercise, we modify the model in Section 2 by allowing for
the positive externality from the average level of human capital in the goods production






where ha denotes average human capital and Â is the externality parameter. We assume
the same taxation and expenditure policies for the government, that is, the raising of taxes
from capital and labor income at a rate given by ¿, and the expenditure of a fraction ¯
of total revenues in a now non-productive public infrastructure. Remaining revenues are
given back to the household as lump sum transfers. (Thus, the only equations that change
with respect to the model in Section 2 are (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8).)
A striking feature of this model is that equilibrium indeterminacy may arise even
for very small values of Â: As an example, consider the following parameter values7:
½ = 0:065;¾ = 0:01;A = 3:5;® = 0:36;Â = 0:075;B = 0:06;¿ = 0:3856 and ¯ =
0:045. The Jacobian matrix evaluated at the stationary equilibrium has one positive
real eigenvalue and two complex eigenvalues with negative real parts, thus yielding a
continuum of equilibria converging to a common balanced growth path.
We proceed now to analyze the welfare properties of the equilibria set in order to
assess the use of debt as a coordination device. Our benchmark economy in this section
is:
½ = 0:065;¾ = 0:3;A = 3:5;® = 0:36;Â = 0:39;B = 0:06;¿ = 0:3856 and ¯ = 0:045
7The rates of growth for physical and human capital along the balanced growth path associated with
this economy are, respectively: ºk = 0:05268 and ºh = 0:04716.
20which yields ºk = 0:06358 and ºh = 0:03950, and the Jacobian matrix has the following
eigenvalues: ¸1 = ¡0:00956, ¸2 = ¡0:13711, and ¸3 = 0:30544. As in Section 3, we make
use of numerical methods to evaluate the lifetime utility associated with di®erent initial
values of u(0). Our computations show that the equilibrium path starting at u(0) = 0:1
renders the highest lifetime utility.
The analysis of the welfare cost of miscoordination becomes especially relevant in this
model. The equilibrium path starting at u(0) = 1 amounts to a welfare cost in the order
of 186:74% of consumption. This magnitude decreases to 11:94% for u(0) = 0:2. These
large costs suggest that the use of debt as an equilibrium selection mechanism may render
a signi¯cant increase in welfare.
Coordination with Debt
In order to illustrate the coordinating role of debt, we permit the government to issue
debt at time zero and to implement the transfers policy given by eq. (4.9). Under this
policy, debt grows at the rate of ºk from t = 0 on, and the ratio of debt to physical capital
is not endogenously determined.
Table 5 presents the welfare gains from coordinating with di®erent levels of debt.
As in the previous section, °co denotes the welfare gain when initial debt crowds out
investment in physical capital; and °nco denotes the welfare gain under no crowding-out
e®ects. Both °co and °nco are expressed as the percentage increase of the consumption in
the equilibrium with debt and with u(0) = 0:1, with respect to the worst equilibrium in
the economy without debt.
Table 5
b
k = 10¡3 b






b(0) :04914 :49153 1:22926 2:45997 3.44558
°co .65123 .65102 .65067 .65010 .64891
°nco .64539 .58404 .43091 -.20697 -2.83125
Notes: These computations were carried out under
½ = 0:065;¾ = 0:3;A = 3:5;® = 0:36;Â = 0:39;B = 0:06;¿ = 0:3856 and ¯ = 0:045; and
k(0) = 0:95^ k¤, h(0) = 1.
Regardless of the e®ects of debt on initial investment, it is clear from Table 5 that
the maximum welfare gain is obtained for b
k = 10¡3. Therefore, we can conclude that the
optimal debt policy is to issue the minimal level that induces u(0) = 0:1 in equilibrium.
21Since a fraction ¯ of taxation revenues is devoted to non productive public infrastructure,
public debt has a negative income e®ect by increasing the amount of wasted resources.
Table 5 shows that the welfare bene¯ts derived from correcting expectations exceed the
welfare costs from those negative income e®ects for low values of b(0).
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we presented a model in which the presence of a government providing
productive services and collecting taxes from capital and labor income may generate a
continuum of equilibria. As we explained above, it is the uncertainty on the level of e®ort
chosen by other agents in equilibrium which makes the existence of a continuum of self-
ful¯lling equilibria possible. Considering an elastic labor supply is thus crucial for our
results. Although we endogenized labor supply by introducing a human capital sector, it
should be clear that similar results could be obtained by assuming leisure as an argument
in the utility function.
One important feature in our model is that the government can use an active budgetary
policy to break down the indeterminacy result. Furthermore, the use of public debt
allows the government to select one equilibrium path by targeting the interest rate. The
mechanism is simple: By ¯xing the long-run level of debt (as a percentage of capital or
total income), and the initial level of debt, there is a unique initial value for the labor
supply such that the market equilibrium satis¯es that imposed condition. This role of
debt can thus be seen as a stabilizer against extrinsic uncertainty. Both the optimal debt
policy and the welfare gains from eliminating this kind of uncertainty, depend on the
considered model and on the distortionary e®ects of the initial debt. Some implications
for empirical analysis can be drawn from our results.
227. Appendixes
Appendix I







1¡®2 and p(t) ´
^ c(t)
^ k(t)
















































The steady state equilibrium is m¤ =
®2½¡(1¡®)B¾













































23Since a13 and a23 are zero, Bu¤ is an eigenvalue of J. Therefore, the sign of the determinant
formed by a11,a12, a21 and a22 gives the sign of the remaining eigenvalues of J. This determinant
is given by
(1¡ ¿)®[®2 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)¾]
(® ¡®2)¾
It is readily seen that under (i) or (ii) the determinant is positive and thus both eigenvalues
must have the same sign, otherwise it is negative. Then, under (i) or (ii), a necessary and
su±cient condition for indeterminacy {that is, two eigenvalues be negative{ is that the trace of
the matrix formed by a11,a12, a21 and a22 be negative. Simple algebra shows that the trace is
given by ￿
® + (1 ¡® ¡¯)¿











Taking into account the restrictions in parameters values to guarantee m¤ > 0, p¤ > 0 and
0 < u¤ < 1, it is readily shown that (i) is a necessary and su±cient condition for equilib-
rium indeterminacy. Likewise, (ii) is necessary and su±cient for the existence of three positive
eigenvalues.
Proof of Proposition 2: It follows the procedure used in the proof of Proposition 1, after the
model is conveniently modi¯ed.
Appendix II
We o®er here a brief explanation of our procedure to compute the lifetime utility. The
consumption path originated at u0 can be written as,
cu0(t) =
cu0(t)
hu0(t)Áhu0(t)Á = ^ cu0(t)hu0(t)Á (7.1)
In a neighborhood of the steady state, the value of ^ cu0(t) is approximated by ^ c¤+³1v12e¸1t+
³2v22e¸2t: Likewise, the human capital path can be written as hu0(t) = h(0)e
R t
0 B(1¡u(s))ds. Now,
taking into account that u(t) = u¤+³1v13e¸1t+³2v23e¸2t, then (3.2) follows directly from (7.1).
In order to ascertain the welfare implications of equilibrium indeterminacy we need to eval-
uate the lifetime utility function along (3.2). As to get an expression which can be easily
computed we proceed as follows. First, performing the change of variable e¸1t = s, and de¯ning
a1 = ¡
½¡(1¡¾)ºhÁ
¸1 , b1 =
³1v13(1¡¾)BÁ
¸1 and b2 =
³2v23(1¡¾)BÁ













24For the computation of the de¯nite integral in (7.2) we divide the range of integration, [0;1], in
n intervals of equal size. For each interval we calculate the value of the function in its midpoint,
then the value of the integral can be approximated by the sum of the areas of the n rectangles.











In all our computations we take n = 5000.
Appendix III
Here, we present the procedure to compute the lifetime utility when the government issue
b0 at time zero, and crowds out investment. We denote by fcb0(t)g1
t=0 the consumption path
originated in this economy. Since the law of motion for physical capital is not continuous at t = 0,
the values for ^ c(0) and u(0) do not correspond to the ones given by the linear stable manifold.
Instead, given the initial values for state variables, ^ k(0);^ b(0), the values for ^ cb0(0) and u(0) have
to be optimally chosen taking into account that the implied values for ^ k(²);^ b(²);^ c(²) and u(²)
(where ² is an arbitrarily small number), must lie on the linear stable manifold. That is, the
initial values for control variables must solve,
^ k(²) ¡ ^ k¤ = ³1v11 +³2v21
^ b(²) ¡^ b¤ = ³1v12 +³2v22
^ c(²) ¡ ^ c¤ = ³1v13 +³2v23
^ u(²)¡ ^ u¤ = ³1v14 +³2v24
where v1j;v2j; j = 1;2;3;4 are the eigenvectors associated with the negative eigenvalues, and
^ k(²) = ^ k(0) +²_ ^ k(0); ^ b(²) = ^ b(0)+ ²_ ^ b(0); ^ c(²) = ^ c(0) +²_ ^ c(0) and ^ u(²) = ^ u(0)+ ²_ ^ u(0).














In order to compute the second integral in (7.4) we proceed as we did in Appendix II. Again,













where ³1 and ³2 are integration constants which depend on ^ k(²) and ^ b(²). The lifetime utility is
thus the sum of (7.5) and (7.6).
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− r(t) starting at u(0)=u+0.001





















− r(t) computed from the non−linear system
−− r(t) computed from the linear approximation